Panel I:  The Changing Landscape of Jurisprudence in Light of the New Communications and Media Alliances by Condon, Creighton O\u27M. et al.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 6 Volume VI 
Number 2 Volume VI Book 2 Article 1 
1996 
Panel I: The Changing Landscape of Jurisprudence in Light of the 
New Communications and Media Alliances 
Creighton O'M. Condon 
Sherman & Sterling 
Robert D. Joffe 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore 
Nicholas J. Jollymore 
Time Inc. 
John R. Tyler 
Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Creighton O'M. Condon, Robert D. Joffe, Nicholas J. Jollymore, and John R. Tyler, Panel I: The Changing 
Landscape of Jurisprudence in Light of the New Communications and Media Alliances, 6 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 427 (1996). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol6/iss2/1 
This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Panel I: The Changing Landscape of
Jurisprudence in Light of the New
Communications and Media Alliances
Moderator: James C. Goodale, Esq. 2
Panelists: Creighton O'M. Condon, Esq.b
Robert D. Joffe, Esq.'
Nicholas J. Jollymore, Esq.d
John R. Tyler, Esq.'
MR. GOODALE: It is a great pleasure to be back at Fordham
University to moderate one of these panels. There is nothing more
important than understanding the information and telecommunica-
tions revolution. I am honored to have been a member of the
Fordham University School of Law faculty over this last decade
when the revolution has really been taking off, and I am indebted
to Fordham for giving me the opportunity to teach some of the law
as it is developing in this fast-moving field. And here we are to-
day, right on the moment when President Clinton apparently is
going to sign perhaps one of the great pieces of legislation of this
century and certainly of this decade-the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (the "1996 Act"). f Nothing could be more timely than this
a. Of Counsel, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, NY; Adjunct Professor, Fordham
University School of Law, New York, NY; Yale University, B.A. 1955; University of
Chicago, J.D. 1958.
b. Partner, Sherman & Sterling, New York, NY; University of Pennsylvania, B.A.
1978; St. John's College, Cambridge, 1978-1979; Columbia University School of Law,
J.D. 1982.
c. Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, NY; Harvard College, A.B., cum
laude 1964; Harvard Law School, J.D., cum laude 1967.
d. Deputy General Counsel, Time Inc., New York, NY; University of Minnesota,
B.A. 1968, M.A. 1970; Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1978; New York Univer-
sity School of Law, LL.M. 1990.
e. Senior Trial Counsel, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington
D.C., Princeton University, B.A. 1974; Vermont Law School, J.D. 1979.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. § 56 (to be
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Symposium, and I think it is thus a very exciting event.
Before I tell you how we are going to proceed, I want to intro-
duce the panelists. Robert Joffe, a partner at Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, is our principal 'speaker today. He has been heavily in-
volved in communication industry mergers acquisitions and the
litigation that has followed and has led the charge attacking the
constitutionality of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"),2 a real expert in our
midst. Nicholas Jollymore is my colleague at Fordham University
School of Law and the Deputy General Counsel of Time Magazine,
Inc. He has taught a course on the media at Fordham for many
years and is a well-known expert in the field. Creighton Condon
is a partner at Shearman & Sterling and is a member of the Merg-
ers and Acquisitions group. Shearman & Sterling has been very
active in the media mergers and acquisitions game, particularly by
representing Viacom International, Inc. John Tyler is senior trial
counsel for the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). He is a govern-
ment warrior in the media mergers and acquisitions wars. He and
Mr. Joffe have been up against each other many times, and today
we will see them dueling again.
The issue today is "The Changing Landscape of Jurisprudence
in Light of the New Communications and Media Alliances." The
.way we have decided to organize this is to make Bob Joffe the
principal speaker. He is going to address the issue of whether, in
fact, we have a changing landscape of jurisprudence or not.
We are going to refer to two articles in this panel: one is by
Robert Pitofsky, former Professor at the Georgetown University
Law Center and current Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Chair-
man, in which he argues that the antitrust laws might have some-
thing else to consider in terms of values other than merely the
codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the "1996 Act"]. The 1996 Act
was signed by President Clinton on February 8, 1996. See Peter H. Lewis, Protest,
Cyberspace-Style, for New Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1996, at A16.
2. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g
denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1991); Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151
(1995).
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economics of the free marketplace,3 and the other is a speech given
in December by Sumner Redstone, the Chairman and CEO of
Viacom, in which he adopts Mr. Pitofsky's reasoning that First
Amendment values should apply to acquisitions.
4
After we hear from Mr. Joffe, we are-all going to respond. We
all have particular positions that relate to the clients that we are
connected with. Mr. Jollymore, fortunately, is at Time magazine,
so he can supposedly and hopefully back up Mr. Joffe. On the
other side we might say we have the Viacom side, because Mr.
Condon has represented Viacom and Mr. Tyler represents the pub-
lic interest. We will hear more from them in a moment, but now
let us hear Bob Joffe.
MR. JOFFE: Thank you, Jim. The last time I presented a
paper somewhat like this, the moderator told me in advance that it
is usually a good idea to start with a joke. When I looked a little
blank, he then said to me, "Bob, if you tell a good joke nobody
will care what else you say." Even with that tempting possibility,
I could not come up then, and cannot come up now, with any good
jokes. Instead I will talk about something that is clear, unambigu-
ous and subject to rational analysis-the United States antitrust
laws.
My topic today is media mergers in the marketplace of ideas
and the application of antitrust analysis. Today's marketplace of
ideas is a high-technology information superhighway, on which an
explosion of new services provides people with access to informa-
tion, entertainment and ideas.
This explosion is part of a technological revolution which, it
has been said, rivals the printing press revolution of the 15th centu-
ry in its impact on our future development. It is not a highway
controlled by particular toll takers, nor is it a highway capable of
being owned in any conventional sense.
The diversity of sources and views that have come into being
3. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051
(1979).
4. Sumner M. Redstone, Mergermania, Lecture at Harvard Law School (Dec. 4,
1995).
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has occurred by allowing competition to proceed within traditional
antitrust constraints. However, special restrictions on the normal
competitive market processes, which are designed to protect the so-
called market for ideas, -could have just the opposite effect.
First, and very briefly, I wish to outline the general antitrust
concerns in corporate mergers. Second, I wish to address a line of
thinking which quite radically disrupts conventional approaches to
the application of antitrust law, and suggest why this line of think-
ing is fundamentally flawed. Third, I would like to make a few
comments regarding what I believe to be the appropriate applica-
tion of contemporary antitrust law to media mergers.
Turning first to general concerns, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
forbids an acquisition if it may substantially lessen competition in
the relevant market.5 The first step in any antitrust analysis of a
merger is to determine the nature and scope of the relevant mar-
kets.6 The next step is to evaluate the impact of the acquisition on
competition in these markets.7
So-called horizontal mergers involve firms within the same
product and geographic market. When two firms that compete in
the same horizontal market merge, there is necessarily a resulting
increase in market concentration. The lawfulness of an acquisition
turns on the purchaser's potential for creating, enhancing or facili-
tating the exercise of market power.8 Market shares and market
concentration are generally taken to be the most visible indicators
of market power, as well as the ability to collude. However, courts
will also look to other factors in order to rebut inferences for mar-
ket share. In particular, the courts examine ease of entry, concen-
5. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §.7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1994)).
6. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (quoting United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (discussing vertical
mergers)); see also id. at 335 (discussing horizontal mergers).
7. Id. at 328, 339 (addressing, respectively, vertical and horizontal mergers). See
generally Richard G. Price, Market Power and Monopoly Power in Antitrust Analysis, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 190 (1989).
8. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332; United States v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co.,
866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989).
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tration ratios, factors affecting the likelihood that the firm can en-
force collective understandings, and any procompetitive effects or
efficiencies of the merger. 9
Next, let me turn to the issue of veitical mergers, which has
been much more controversial. Vertical mergers essentially involve
the joining of firms which have or could have supplier-customer
relationships.' ° Foreclosing competitors from a segment of the
market otherwise open to them may clog competition. This is a
concern that has been raised since the 1962 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.1
The theory that vertical mergers are anticompetitive has been
seriously questioned despite the revived interest in vertical analy-
sis.' 2 It'is worth noting that how one analyzes the antitrust impli-
cations of vertical mergers is the subject of scholarly debate. There
has been an acknowledgement that vertical mergers often involve
efficiency benefits.1 3  Indeed, the recently appointed chairman of
the FTC, Professor Robert Pitofsky, has written, "[i]t is difficult to
identify rules defining the legality of vertical mergers because the
9. See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Freedom of entry
is the single most important guarantor of competition in a concentrated industry."); Oahu
Gas Serv. v. Pacific Resources Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir.) (high market share does
not imply monopoly power "in a market with low entry barriers or other evidence of a
defendant's inability to control prices or exclude competitors"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870
(1988). It should be noted that for an entity to be a monopolist it must have control over
prices and entry into the market. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586 (1956). Control over prices will not be effective over any substantial period
unless entry can also be blockaded. Id.
10. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323; see also for a general discussion of vertical
merger issues: Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 1988
QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 345; Barbara A. White, Black and White Thinking in the Gray Areas
of Antitrust: The Dismantling of Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 GEO. WASH L. REV.
1 (1991); Michael W. Klass & Michael A. Salinger, Do New Theories of Vertical Fore-
closure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases?
ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (Fall 1995).
11. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
12. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n., Horizontal Merger Guidelines
§ 0 (1992) [hereinafter "1992 Merger Guidelines"], reprinted in 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552
(1992).
13. See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: Reply
to Reiffer and Vita Comment, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 943, 944 (1995).
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anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers are more uncertain
while their efficiencies are more frequent."
' 14
There have been two principal schools of thought that have
governed antitrust jurisprudence. The first, which might be called
the Multivalued Approach, was substantially endorsed by the War-
ren Court.' 5 The Multivalued Approach views Section 7 of the
Clayton Act 16 as a mechanism both for preserving the type of eco-
nomic structure and for safeguarding the social and political values
by looking toward a broader meaning of the term "competition."
This may have concerned Congress in the Clayton Act's passage.
Under the second approach, inspired by the Chicago School,
mergers are judged primarily, if not exclusively, by their economic
effect. This defines competition solely in an economic context and
disregards noncompetitive concerns.'
7
I do not intend today to try to resolve the respective merits of
these approaches, and it is safe to conclude that for the foreseeable
future, both views will have roles to play. I do, however, wish to
indicate that even under the broader Multivalued Approach, anti-
trust laws should not be the tool used to address political concerns
about the role of the media, or, as the chairman of Viacom has
recently suggested, 8 become a tool of the First Amendment. These
suggestions are wrong not only as a matter of theory, but also as
a matter of practical application. Perhaps it is for these reasons
that they are not supported by either case law or scholarly analysis.
It is true that a Chicago School approach considerably narrows the
range of antitrust enforcement.' 9 However, neither the Multivalued
nor the Chicago School approach seeks to give antitrust enforce-
14. Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a
Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 201 (1992).
15. Cf. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics and Politics: Reflections
on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1980).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
17. This approach received support in Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
18. See Redstone, supra note 4.
19. Contrast the broader concerns also referred to in Steven Axinn, Panel Discussion,
Merger Enforcement and Practice, 50 ANTITRUST L. J. 233, 237-38 (1982).
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ment an independent political mission to oppose corporate mergers
in order to construct a particular political environment.
In much lay theorizing about antitrust law, there is a pervasive
myth that antitrust is primarily concerned with keeping firms small.
In fact, the core question for the courts and the relevant agencies
is a prediction of the merger's effect on competition. 20 Competi-
tion, fortunately for the sake of efficiency and innovation, does not
require smallness. In his influential article in 1979, Professor
Pitofsky stressed that smallness was itself a mythic virtue.2
Today the media business is not a small cottage industry, and
even a start-up company rarely begins in a garage. This is not a
reality from which we should retreat. Chairman Pitofsky noted in
his recent Senate confirmation hearings that we should acknowl-
edge the reality of the new business environment of modem indus-
try.22
So now we turn to the question of whether there is a role for
the First Amendment in antitrust analysis. The suggestion has been
made by Sumner Redstone that media mergers will restrict the
scope of democracy. It is this political concern that triggers the
involvement of the First Amendment.
When addressing free speech concerns, we must not think only
of old-style analogies of the desirability of a speaker on every
street comer; rather we need also to think in terms of the desirabili-
ty of a World Wide Web site for every speaker, and fast, effective,
and efficient ways to draw on global information and to communi-
cate interactively. E-mail, fiber optics, cable television, satellite,
microwave transmitters, and the digital revolution create a new
cultural space-a cyberspace. We must adjust our thinking if we
are to protect the competitive process in some way beyond
20. See, e.g., FrC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). The consistent
motivation for antitrust law and its interpretation and enforcement by the courts is to
preserve robust competition. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972) (describing antitrust law as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise").
21. Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 1051, 1058-59.
22. Nomination of Robert Pitofsky: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Robert Pitofsky).
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Luddite-like reactions to the business which makes this technology
widely available.23
Let me turn specifically to the suggestions that antitrust princi-
ples invoke the First Amendment to apply special scrutiny to verti-
cal and horizontal media concentration. First, the very suggestion
is grounded on a fundamental point of confusion. The First
Amendment is a restraint on the government's powers to restrict
speech-its terms proclaim that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech."24 The words of the Free Speech
Clause do not mandate a positive government program of action.
They are meant to be, and have always been construed to be, a
restraint on governmental-not private-action.
In a recent speech, the chairman of Viacom, Sumner Redstone,
argued that antitrust laws must prevent media companies from
undermining the rights of speakers to reach an audience, and the
rights of listeners to hear them. It seems that Viacom's own merg-
ers with Paramount and Blockbuster and the sale of its cable sys-
tems to TCI-related companies 25 presented no such concerns. How-
ever, in surveying the activities of its competitors, Mr. Redstone
thinks there may be other dangerous increases in concentration
which the FTC should devote itself to in the name of free speech. 6
The arguments the Viacom chairman based his case upon seem
to be wide of the mark. He enthusiastically referred to the new
FTC chairman's article of the late 1970s, when Professor Pitofsky
made the case for a political dimension to antitrust.27 As I indicat-
ed, neither of the two approaches to antitrust provide support for
Redstone's position. Chairman Pitofsky has made this explicit by
recently saying that the traditional antitrust principles guide the
analysis of mergers in any industry.28 Professor Pitofsky's 1979
23. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing
the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE
L. J. 1619 (1995).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. TCI refers to Tele-Communications, Inc.
26. See Redstone, supra note 4.
27. See generally Pitofsky, supra note 3.
28. See Kirk Victor, Merger Man, NATIONAL J., Jan. 20 1996, at 121 (quoting Robert
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article was a reply to the growing dominance of the strict economic
approach in the late 1970s. It was an attempt to refocus the debate
with a multilayer of concerns. It did not aim to radically usurp the
debate and lay it on an altogether different foundation.
Let us turn to Professor Pitofsky's argument. His thesis ad-
vanced that there was a political content in interpreting antitrust
laws stemming from the broad political concerns motivating pas-
sage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.29 The concerns were that
an excessive concentration of economic power would produce anti-
democratic pressures, reduce individual freedom, and incline gov-
ernments to direct intervention in the marketplace.
Professor Pitofsky was at pains to point out that his approach
was not diametrically at odds with the Chicago School views, but
sought to supplement them. Professor Pitofsky's objection was to
an exclusively microeconomic analysis of antitrust.30 He is clear
that non-economic concerns should not be dispositive, but merely
that there may be circumstances where they might properly be
taken into account. Political considerations, he said, may come
into play in extreme situations where market domination of a firm
approaches being total: where there is a danger that firms will
become the sole voice in the marketplace, or worse, extra-govern-
mental.31
These are not the normal circumstances of a merger. Certainly
no one---critics and proponents alike-suggest that the current
media mergers raise such concerns. The sort of language quoted
in the Congressional debate on the Sherman and Clayton Acts and
the Cellar-Kefauver anti-merger amendment,32 regarding the fears
of nationalization and totalitarianism, 33 is not and need not be the
concern of antitrust authorities today. As Professor Pitofsky wrote,
"that kind of language is not helpful in deciding whether a merger
Pitofsky).
29. Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 1057, 1060-64.
30. Id. at 1052.
31. Id. at 1056.
32. Id. at 1056 n.17 (discussing legislative history of Sherman Act).
33. Id. at 1061-65.
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between two companies of given size in specific markets is le-
gal. 34
The political role of antitrust law cannot be the result of some
far-off and speculative concerns. Competitive realities certainly
must be taken into account, such as the explosive growth of the
information superhighway. Although antitrust laws are designed to
prevent anti-competitive concentration, the acquisition itself must
be the proximate cause of the injury or threatened injury.
There are very good reasons why this should be the case. First,
using antitrust law as a political tool would be an inefficient way
to address social concerns, particularly those involving fundamental
questions involving the number and nature of speakers.36
Second, such an ideological approach would contain its own
political dangers. Deciding at what point concentration leads to
anti-competitive effects is always uncertain. The role of the merger
guidelines and how they guide the DOJ, the FTC, and court inter-
pretations is complex and unsure, even where it only involves legal
and economic theory.37 Political and ethereal concepts like the
marketplace of ideas would pose further problems. It bears fre-
quent repetition that intervention to favor a certain outcome in the
marketplace of ideas is plainly beyond the scope of the First
Amendment and beyond the reviewing function of our antitrust
agencies.
Third, one must ask how a political antitrust analysis of concen-
tration could apply to the so-called marketplace of ideas. The
suggestion has been made by Redstone that antitrust laws can keep
the marketplace of ideas competitive. The marketplace of ideas
34. Id. at 1064.
35. McKeon Construction v. McClatchy Newspapers, 1969 WL 226, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 24, 1969).
36. Cf. Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and
Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195-96 (1977).
37. See generally Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146,
1153 n.6 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (discussing court's acceptance and use of the Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines in antitrust analysis); Steven A. Newborn & Virginia L. Snider,
The Growing Judicial Acceptance of the Merger Guidelines, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 849 (1992)
(evaluating the pros and cons of the courts' use of the Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines).
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encompasses the expression of all thoughts, images, and messages
with which people communicate with one another. It is not re-
stricted to particular institutions or settings, or to particular forms
of communication. Its breadth and depth are enormous.
There is a pervasive misunderstanding about the marketplace of
ideas, which treats ideas as if they were fungible products, and
people who come to believe ideas as if they were traders who
merely buy and sell their beliefs. The inaptness of this view is
revealed when one considers how the efficiency of such a market-
place might come to be judged. Good or important ideas do not
have prices whose worth is subject to supply and demand. A good
idea does not have a higher price than a bad one. This is why in
the jurisprudence of the First Amendment, the term "marketplace
of ideas" is used, not to denote the actual workings of a market,
but is a descriptive analogy for the free flow of ideas.38
The question is whether antitrust laws should be used to regu-
late this free flow of ideas. The suggestion that they should is
novel and completely contrary to established First Amendment and
antitrust jurisprudence. In First Amendment terms, it would require
the government to determine which speakers are too powerful,
which should be silenced or disadvantaged competitively, and
which information listeners should be listening to more. However,
the traditional focus of the First Amendment has been to protect
private citizens against such government determinations.
The Supreme Court has forthrightly said: "The concept that the
government may restrict the speech of some elements in our soci-
1
38. The confusion regarding the meaning of the "marketplace of ideas" has stemmed,
in part, from Justice Holmes' first use of the concept as "free trade" in ideas in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). He suggested that free trade in ideas would
lead to "truth." id. Justice Holmes equated this notion of truth with whatever ideas came
to be accepted. Id. For the use of the phrase "marketplace of ideas" as a descriptive
analogy, see American Assoc. Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech
Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 949-58 (1993). See generally Stanley Ingber, The
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE L.J. 6-8; C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 89-91 (1989).
39. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1965); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly for-
eign to the First Amendment."4 The thrust of the First Amend-
ment, especially in relation to the freedom of mass communication,
is to be suspicious of government manipulation of the terms on
which communication proceeds.1
The government may have, in confined instances, a positive
role to play in providing public fora for speakers and ensuring that
certain public resources are equitably available.42 However, under
the First Amendment, if the government does have any role with
respect to speech, it must ensure it remains strictly neutral between
the parties affected.43
Now to antitrust analysis. It is certainly true that the mass
media market forms part of the marketplace of ideas. There has
never been any suggestion in the cases that antitrust analysis of
concentration among mass media providers bears any special con-
stitutional concerns or heightened Clayton Act scrutiny. Let us call
this the "greater stringency" thesis.
There is no line of authority that Section 7's concern with mar-
ket power of an acquiring company should be especially stringent
in relation to media mergers. The test remains the same: "Acqui-
sitions are proscribed only if they will probably result in a substan-
tial anti-competitive effect.""4
The government's 1960s case against Columbia Pictures was
one of the early actions considering the effect on market competi-
tion of the then-new media technology.45 Even then, it was held
that the vigor of competition in this fast-changing industry requires
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
41. C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press and the Constitution, 10 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 421 (1993).
42. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 295 U.S. 367, 400 (1969); R. Randall
Rainey, The Public's Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic Governance, and
Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties of the Electron-
ic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269 (1993).
43. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 793-94 (1988).
44. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 196 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
45. Id.
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a more subtle analysis than merely looking to market share percent-
ages at a given point in time. The case indicated that courts should
look to many other factors relating to the maintenance of market
position and to competition with other media. There is no indica-
tion whatsoever of the greater stringency thesis in any of the cases
that follow.
46
So let us turn now to what is the proper role of mergers in the
modem media business. What sort of concerns should inform the
antitrust analysis of the media mergers that have attracted so much
attention as of late? Let me briefly mention some of the general
points which should be kept very much to the forefront of any
discussion. They have been overlooked by many of those such as
Mr. Redstone, who claim a zealous regard for the public interest in
media matters. The recently announced media mergers are indeed
important, but they are important in highlighting how our frame-
work for judging media companies must be applied if it is to keep
up with the technological change which is their life blood. Much
of the recent talk claiming that media mergers are anticompetitive
or impede access to the marketplace of ideas fails entirely to ac-
knowledge the modem reality of a marketplace wrought by rapid
technological change. A number of factors need to be stressed in
constructing an appropriate antitrust analysis of industries fueled by
advanced technology. The configuration of the markets involved
in the intersection between ostensibly different markets is changing
rapidly. Additionally, in industries exhibiting constant product and
process innovation, the market position of incumbents, leaders and
laggers will change rapidly. New entrants can easily appear or
quickly be rendered obsolete.47
Moreover, the information superhighway is becoming so diverse
and international that the number and types of competitors are
46. See, e.g., Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D.
Ark. 1995); Cable Am. Corp. v. FTC, 795 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ala. 1992); United States
v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Columbia Picture
Indus., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Times Mirror, 774 F. Supp.
606 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
47. See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust
High-Technology Industries, 64 ANTrrRUsT L.J.. 247, 258 (1995).
440 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
rapidly expanding. Nothing illustrates this better than the competi-
tion between telephone companies and cable operators, or that
between satellite dishes and cable opened up by the new digital
technology. How about the fact that a World Wide Web site in
Zaire is as accessible to me in my office as one across the street in
midtown Manhattan? In addition, other writers argue that high
technology industries are practically immune to the potential for
cartelization because of the uncertainties generated by domestic and
international competition. 48 Finally, mergers, joint ventures, and
cooperation among competitors have increasingly become a com-
petitive necessity in order to invest in and exploit research and
development. Of course, in a large marketplace with wide bound-
aries and a greater number of players, the antitrust concerns of such
cooperation are lessened, not heightened. This environment mili-
tates against the finding of any antitrust concerns, not in favor of
their presence.
Joseph Kattan has written that markets characterized by rapidly
changing technology are certainly less susceptible to anti-competi-
tive harm.49 We should also recall the holding in United States v.
General Dynamics,50 where the Supreme Court stressed that histori-
cal market share may not be a good indicator of the ability to raise
prices in the future where there are material changes in the pattern
and structure of the industry. More recently, in FTC v. PPG In-
dustries, Inc.,51 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that
in rapidly changing markets, the market shares may not be able to
be readily assessed.
One can say that the information superhighway breaks the nex-
us between the size of firms and the control of ideas. The central
point is that the information superhighway has many entry points.
The communications which pulse through it are two-way, interac-
48. Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Effi-
ciency and the Rewards of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 965 (1993) (quoting
Thomas Jorde & David Teece, Innovation Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH L.J.
1, 3 (1989)).
49. Id.
50. 417 U.S. 486 (1974).
51. 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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tive, broadband and digitally switched. The capacity of this infor-
mation superhighway is potentially unlimited. The analogy to the
highway is not like being stuck without exits on an expressway; it
is like being faced with an untold number of possible exits, possi-
ble routes, possible vantage points, and even possible forms of
transport on a great, flowing, multidimensional stream.
It is overly simplistic to think that cable owners will control by
whim the availability of programming and have a stranglehold over
the content of programs available to consumers. What drives the
provision, of newer and better technology is the impetus of the high
technology revolution itself. What drives the creation of program-
ming are the demands of increasingly educated and informed con-
sumers.
The race to provide the most extensive range of, and access to,
information technology in entertainment has a natural competitive
check. Any player in the media market is ultimately in check to
the demands of consumers who will vote either with the switch of
a button or the click of a mouse to control the services they insist
upon.
Even if some control could be exercised over access to a pack-
age of service, there are two crucial caveats to keep in mind. First,
the marketplace of ideas is broader than just any one entry point
into the market or delivery of any one type of information or enter-
tainment product. In addition to cable, there are satellite and tele-
phonic entry points to the media marketplace. Indeed, AT&T's
recent announcement of an investment in Direct TV highlights the
convergence of these technologies. There is also a universe of
outlets outside the home: schools, colleges, the workplace, cine-
mas, and even Internet cafes.
Second, even if the delivery conduit of one type of information
or entertainment product could be controlled by a so-called gate-
keeper, the control over the content of that product is powerful, and
competitive forces keep that control diversified and imperfect. The
content of the product must be constantly reinvented and repro-
duced. If the public watches a video program provided by one
media company, it in no way guarantees that the public will watch
that company's programs in the future.
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In this way the provision of video programming and movies is
unlike the selling of soap powder, which has a monopoly position
in the marketplace. Media companies cannot coast along on the
basis of having locked up a section of the market. A soap powder
seller only competes with other soap powder sellers. A movie
distribution service competes with all other suppliers of entertain-
ment and communication services from satellite to the Internet.
Yesterday's sale tells you very little about tomorrow's.
Monopolists restrict output, and that is not consistent with the
explosion in services and outlets that we are seeing today. Nor is
it consistent with the inability of media companies to stifle the
production of ideas. The current media mergers show that there is
a race to provide information and entertainment as effectively and
as efficiently as possible. Only when competitive forces allow the
most efficient business to thrive will the plethora of opportunity
work for us and not drown us in the surfeit of choice. Modem
media businesses themselves must be allowed to cooperate, to form
joint ventures and strategic alliances, and to consolidate so that
they may productively exploit the opportunities which will benefit
us all.
That is not to say that industry should not be constrained by the
antitrust law; it should be. It does not mean that government
should not be constrained by the First Amendment; it should be.
However, there is no need for novel draconian theories or interpre-
tation of existing laws. What there is a need for, as always, is
attention to the facts of each particular transaction and not to the
political hype. There is a need for openness to the reality that in
a fast changing, high-tech world the facts will, in all probability,
demonstrate an environment on which competition thrives and
monopoly is impossible.
I will conclude by saying that there is no incompatibility among
traditional antitrust rules, a vibrant marketplace of ideas protected
by the First Amendment, and the efficient delivery of media servic-
es in the modern high-tech world. Distorting economic regulation
or legal intervention under the fanciful guise of protecting First
Amendment concerns is not only contrary to settled law and consti-
tutional principles, but could easily disrupt that healthy balance.
[Vol. 6:427
1996] SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON NEW MEDIA ALLIANCES 443
MR. GOODALE: Well that is a provocative beginning.
Creighton Condon, perhaps you would like to make some respons-
es. While you are getting ready, I just thought I would make a
bridge between what Bob has said and what can be said on the
other side-the argument that is made by Sumner Redstone, who,
as you know, is the chairman of Viacom. As he points out in his
speech,52 he is a Harvard Law School graduate and was a practic-
ing lawyer. Even though he is known as a businessman, he can
never stop being a lawyer. One of his greatest joys was drafting
a complaint against Time Warner to make the argument that his
pay service had been excluded from the local cable system, a case
which he points out, they won.53
MR. JOFFE: Well he did lose it.
MR. GOODALE: He did not win. We will come back to that
in a moment. I guess he did draft the complaint, though.
MR. JOFFE: The case was settled on far more favorable terms
to Time Warner than to Viacom.
MR. GOODALE: The record has now been made clear.
Redstone's argument on the antitrust and First Amendment grounds
is that the antitrust concept of a bottleneck can be applied against
the cable industry because the cable industry is a monopoly.54 The
societal rationale for such application is that if it is applied success-
fully against a cable bottleneck it will create diversity.
I just want to say, before we go around the panel, I wonder if
what we are really talking about here is the government's role in
creating a diversity of speakers and speech. It is an issue that
never seems to leave the communication law arena, and, as Mr.
Redstone points out, it reappeared in the "must-carry" case United
States v. Turner.55 As Redstone says, the basis of that decision was
that if sufficient proof could be shown of a failure of the broadcast
industry, the concept and value of diversity should be served by
52. See Redstone, supra note 4.
53. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Time Warner Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
54. See Redstone, supra note 4.
55. 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993).
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having the broadcast speakers speak on cable.56
I did not mean to speak that long and I hope I did not take
away some of your best shots, but I did want to make a bridge
because the Redstone speech is not available to all of you.
MR. CONDON: Just by way of introduction, I am unshackled
by being a mergers and acquisitions lawyer and not an antitrust
lawyer. Therefore, I approach this from a little different perspec-
tive: more from the fundamental question as to what role govern-
ment has in this area-whether it's through the antitrust laws, the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") approaches, or
through the 1996 Act.57
What role does the government have in trying to ensure that
there continues to be a diversity of ideas and of ownership in the
marketplace of ideas? I think, at some level, clearly it is appropri-
ate for the government to have a role.
I think Redstone is essentially stating that you do not want a
situation where there is undue concentration of ideas anymore than
you want to look at the traditional antitrust analysis from strictly
an economic point of view; to struggle with that, and to suggest
that one possible way of dealing with this issue is to look at it
from an antitrust perspective.
Pitofsky, in his 1979 article, points out that in fact, if you look
through the legislative history, there are three political values that
56. See Redstone, supra note 4.
57. The history of communications regulation began with the Communications Act
of 1934, 48 Stat. § 1064 (Jun. 19, 1934) (enacted for the purpose of regulating interstate
and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio, and creating the FCC). The
Act has been amended repeatedly through the years. Most notably, in 1992 Congress
passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. § 1460 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) which
was enacted to: promote the availability to the public of a diversity of views and informa-
tion through cable television and other distribution media; maximize availability to ensure
continued expansion of capacity of programs offered on cable systems; protect consumer
interests in receipt of cable service; and ensure cable television operators do not have
undue market power. Most recently, the Act was amended by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. § 56 (to be codified in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
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were reflected in the antitrust laws.58 First, there is a fear that
excessive concentration of economic power will breed anti-demo-
cratic political pressures. Second, there is a desire to enhance
individual and business freedom by reducing the range within
which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls
the welfare of all. The third, and overriding political concern, is
that an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants will make
it impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in eco-
nomic affairs. A number of the antitrust laws at various points in
time were drafted against the backdrop of fascist or communist
systems where there was a concern that, in fact, one of the factors
leading to those systems was a concentration of economic power.59
Redstone points out that in fact, the same dangers exist in me-
dia mergers. These dangers are present to the extent that we per-
mit any significant concentration in methods of distribution of
ideas, whether it is in the cable area or other areas where there is
significant market power and an ability to keep out competing
voices by blocking access to that method of communicating.
Obviously, there are different ways of communicating in differ-
ent voices or different distribution methods. It would be a mistake
though, at this point, to look at the entire spectrum of ways to
deliver ideas as the appropriate marketplace. If you do that, you
get to an extreme where almost no merger could be anti-competi-
tive because you are judging it against, for example, the ability of
Fordham law students to get ideas in class. There is an intermedi-
ate position and, as the technology develops, one of the challenges
for the antitrust regulators is going to be defining those markets.
I think that Redstone is suggesting that the same political dan-
gers that exist from allowing economic concentration also exist in
the media to the extent that it is controlled by a small group of
companies. That is, the danger that the government will feel it
imperative to intercede with respect to free speech matters. It in-
creases the likelihood and the possibility of government interven-
tion. The concentration of control in the marketplace of ideas also
58. Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 1051.
59. Id. at 1060-65.
446 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
raises the specter that the government could step in and, through
the co-opting of a limited number of players, in effect control that
marketplace for ideas.
I think Redstone's suggestion is that the appropriate way to
deal with such dangers is to stop in the first instance an over-con-
centration so that everyone can be assured that such government
intervention will not occur. That is a different analysis than how
you would apply this as a practical matter in enforcing the antitrust
laws, which is a different issue and more difficult.
I would suggest that to a certain extent political considerations
already are taken into account in enforcing the antitrust laws. If
you look over the last 20 or 30 years, it seems fairly clear that
whether you couch antitrust enforcement strictly in terms of eco-
nomics, you are, in effect, following a political agenda. If you
look at enforcement during the 1980s compared to enforcement of
the Clinton administration, there is a political difference and a
political philosophy in how that enforcement is proceeding.
As Professor Pitofsky points out in his article, economics only
gets you so far.6o There is only so much precision that you can
build into an economic model. The issue is how explicit to make
the existence of the political factors when enforcing antitrust laws.
Redstone points out in his speech, as an example, the type of
situation that he thinks would cause concern here in the United
States: Rupert Murdoch's control over newspapers and cable tele-
vision in the United Kingdom ("U.K."), which has become an issue
in the U.K. with respect to whether or not he has an inordinate
influence over the marketplace of ideas.6' In that respect, Pitofsky
himself alludes to the possibility that the antitrust laws should have
the flexibility to deal with such a situation. 62 He illustrates a hypo-
thetical situation in which a single wealthy family acquires the
leading newspaper in each of the 20 largest cities in the United
States.63 He points out that one possible response to that situation
60. See generally id.
61. See Redstone, supra note 4.
62. See Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 1054.
63. Id.
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would be the enactment of special legislation to head off that de-
velopment. If a bill were to become bottled up in committee, how-
ever, under Pitofsky's view, the Sherman Act should be sufficiently
flexible to take into account that threat to political values.
The political values in the above example clearly are not of the
same nature as the political values that were contemplated when
the antitrust laws were put into effect. But Redstone is suggesting
that there is a role in antitrust to expand beyond the political values
that were specifically in mind when the antitrust laws were enacted,
to take into account existing developments.
MR. GOODALE: Is not Creighton Condon right that there is
a risk in having one family own the leading newspaper in each of
the 20 largest cities, and is not one of the problems the situation
we have seen recently which has involved the concept of "corpo-
rate journalism?" This is a pejorative term to describe journalism
which is not really springing from the heart of the journalist, but
springing from the pocketbook of the journalist's owner. One of
the best examples of that phenomenon is the CBS action in 60
Minutes in which the network turned the Brown and Williamson
story off,' although it later got turned on again.65 It's also alleged
the same instincts and purposes led to ABC's settlement of a huge
libel case.66 So Sumner Redstone has really put his finger on some
major problems.
MR. JOLLYMORE: That fear, Jim, is not a new concern.
Back in 1966, ITT entered into negotiations and came close to
consummating a deal to acquire ABC, and that acquisition was
challenged before the FCC.67 One of the central points of opposi-
tion to the acquisition was that ITT, a large conglomerate with
64. 60 Minutes: CBS says "No " to interview regarding tobacco industry due to possi-
ble lawsuit (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 12, 1995).
65. 60 Minutes: Jeffrey Wigand discloses information on Brown and Williamson and
attempts are made to rebut the claims (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1995); see, Rita
Ciolli, Tales About Tobacco?/Former exec. called to testify, NEWSDAY, Nov. 18, 1995, at
A04.
66. Alix M. Freedman & Elizabeth Jensen, Capital Cities, Philip Morris Settle
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1995, at A3; see Ciolli, supra note 65, at A04.
67. in re American Broadcasting Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 245 (1966).
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interests that span many different industries ,and the globe, would
use this organ of communication, ABC, to promote its own corpo-
rate interests.68
The FCC, acting on submissions from the DOJ and others,
upheld the transfer of the broadcast licenses in that case, but not
without dissent.69 But I think the publicity surrounding the case
eventually forced ITT to back away from the merger and the acqui-
sition, for the acquisition never happened. So the fear that Sumner
Redstone raises is one that has been kicking around for a long
time.
However, I, as a lawyer for a publishing company, Time, Inc.,
which is owned by a large media company, Time Warner, am
somewhat skeptical of this notion that the growth of large media
companies will result in less speech. Since the Time Warner merg-
er about seven years ago, I have watched our publications, our
Internet operations, and our on-line services very closely. I person-
ally have not seen anything that would indicate to me that the large
corporate ownership of our magazines has influenced the way the
magazines cover the news.
Time magazine, overall, has presented coverage of its corporate
parent, Time Warner, that is at least as balanced and accurate as
the media in general, and is often very critical. Our magazines
seem to feel very free to pan Warner Brothers motion pictures.
This week, Entertainment Weekly reviews Big Bully, 70 which is a
Warner Brothers release. It says it belongs to the genre of corny
dumb-dumb comedies, and gave it a rating of "C.,, 71 Even though
Time Warner is engaged in consummating a merger with Turner,
when People magazine, another one of our magazines, did a profile
of Ted Turner in December, it felt free to point out that Turner was
once on lithium for manic-depression.72 They were not exactly
68. Id. at 252.
69. Id. at 262-330 (dissenting to the approval of the transfer-merger transaction).
70.. Lisa Schwarzbaum, ENT. WKLY., Feb. 16, 1996, at 48.
71. Id.
72. Ted Turner; The Titan Once Known As Captain Outrageous Pulls Off His Most
Surprising Year, PEOPLE, Dec. 25, 1995, at 87.
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pulling their punches.
I would like to follow up on a point that Bob Joffe made.
There are reasons, I think, that publications like ours resist any
insidious influence from a corporate parent. We live in an ad-
vanced technological society, and we rely on the media for accu-
rate, objective, up-to-date information in making political decisions,
business decisions and decisions affecting scientific matters. Publi-
cations which do not provide accurate, up to date, and unbiased
information will lose in the marketplace.
Time Warner's executives, I am sure, are well aware of the
contribution which the publication company, Time, Inc., makes to
the bottom line. The financial figures released on February 6, 1996
in the papers showed that Time, Inc. contributed $175 million to
Time Warner's bottom line.73 I think there's a clear realization that
for publications to survive, they must serve their markets well. In
my view, there would be a huge financial disincentive to have
corporate executives tinker around with the journalistic content of
those publications.
In fact, it may well be that the opposite is true. Because there
are substantial assets behind a publishing company like Time, Inc.,
it is more able to resist the typical pressures put on publishers by
political institutions and advertisers.
Another safeguard against a conglomerate influencing the con-
trol of the publication is the professionalism of the journalists. The
journalists see themselves as a profession, having shared values
across publications and companies, and recoil at the notion of cor-
porate control of content. That is exactly what happened in the
CBS case. The journalists from Sixty Minutes went to the New
York Times and complained publicly that the lawyers for CBS were
attempting to control the program's content.74 The lawyers did not
73. Time Warner Inc. <TWX.N> 84 EBITDA Grew 26 Pct, REUTERS, LIMITED FINAN-
CIAL REPORT, Feb. 6, 1996 ("Fourth-quarter EBITDA [(Earnings Before Interest, Taxation,
Depreciation, and Amortization)] for Time Inc., the company's publishing division, rose
over 11 percent to $175 million from $157 million a year earlier.").
74. Howard Kurtz, '60 Minutes' Kills Piece On Tobacco Industry; CBS Fears Law-
suit, Cites ABC Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at A03.
450 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
make that decision for a corporate political agenda; it was because,
as I perceived it, the lawyers felt there was a legal risk.
For those reasons, I'm very skeptical of the argument that
Sumner Redstone makes.
MR. GOODALE: Before I turn to the representative of the
public interest, let me respond for a moment. Do you really think,
Nick Jollymore, that Time magazine could run a hard-hitting article
raising the issue that we're discussing today and taking the point
of view of this side of the table-that concentration is really a
problem for all publications, including Time magazine?
MR. JOLLYMORE: I think if there's a constraint to a maga-
zine like Time magazine running such an article, it is not imposed
by the fact that it's owned by Time Warner. I think the constraint
is imposed by the market which it serves. Time magazine, like
Newsweek and U.S. News & World Report, is a mass market publi-
cation, and there are constraints in serving a mass market. You
don't find magazines that serve a mass market crusading for radical
causes. They may represent points of view that are radical, but
they're usually espoused by a party outside of the corporation. So
I think if there is a constraint, it doesn't come from ownership by
a corporate conglomerate.
MR. GOODALE: I'll pick on you once more. Sometimes, it's
a little more fun than antitrust. Do you really think that the law-
yers at ABC and CBS, each company being involved in a merger
of the kind we're talking about today, were not influenced by the
terms and conditions of that merger to do what they did-in the
case of CBS, to not run the story; in the case of ABC, to settle a
libel suit?
MR. JOLLYMORE: The short answer, Jim, is I don't know.
But I can tell you from my experience at doing pre-publication
review for libel issues and copyright infringement issues that it's
seldom that dramatic. Seldom do the lawyers who are involved in
the discussions with the editors get into such considerations. Actu-
ally, I should not say seldom; I've never seen it happen. It's a
much more mundane process. You're focusing on exposure to libel
law rather than what the executives at the Time Warner building
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are going to think. So my guess would be, although I don't know,
that the answer is no.
MR. GOODALE: Mr. Tyler, we can't let Mr. Joffe get away
with this broad, sweeping J. P. Morgan type of definition of merg-
ers. The antitrust laws apply, but it's hard to figure how, and cer-
tainly we should never have any other values besides antitrust any-
way. He's absolutely correct about all that, isn't he?
. MR. TYLER: Unlike my co-panelists in the private sector, I,
as a member of the DOJ, must always begin with a disclaimer to
the effect that my remarks this morning are just that-mine and
mine alone. My employer very wisely retains the right to disavow
everything I say in this discussion.
Bob Joffe and I have met many times in different fora, includ-
ing federal courts. We always insist to our audience that at the
very least, several grains of salt should be put on the other's re-
marks. If not, such remarks should just be disavowed entirely.
I'm not going to break that tradition this morning.
But first, I have to begin with another disclaimer. The fact is,
I haven't been involved with antitrust law since my second year of
law school and that has been a purposeful decision. My experience
is more in the First Amendment area at this time.
In that regard, Mr. Joffe speaks of various people who have
opined as to the political content of antitrust law, questioning
whether it should exist or not. Certainly the First Amendment
screams it. The First Amendment, of course, stands for the propo-
sition that we must have the widest possible diversity of opinions
in any marketplace-diverse and, hopefully often, antagonistic
opinions. That is one of the principles upon which our democracy
depends.
Mr. Joffe speaks of the competition in our telecommunications
markets. He speaks of the fact that, or the proposition that, cable
companies cannot possibly have a stranglehold on ideas in the
telecommunication markets, that they have enormous competition,
not only from other cable operators or MSOs," but from broadcast
75. Multiple System Operator ("MSO"). See In re Review of the Commission's
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television. Now DBS76 television has successfully arrived, and,
possibly as a result of the 1996 Act, we will see the telephone
companies come in with their own video programming. So basical-
ly the pitch is, why worry? There will be enormous diversity.
But in referring or responding to that, I always begin with tech-
nology. Remember, cable operators have the technology now to
reach almost 70 percent of television households."
As the Supreme Court remarked in the Turner Broadcasting
case, once a cable company connects with your household, it can
determine, using its technology, what you will and will not watch,
because you are dependent upon that coaxial cable to receive your
video fare.78
It is said that cable companies can and do produce a wide di-
versity of programming. I am not going to argue with that. But
remember that they do not necessarily have an interest in providing
competition to the programming they provide. If a cable company
puts on a 24-hour news service, common sense tells us that it
might not want an independent 24-hour news service carried on
another one of its channels. Why? Because the independent news
service would compete with the 24-hour news service that the cable
company owns. Remember the cable company is carrying advertis-
ing on the 24-hour news service that it owns.
Taking those factors into consideration, why would a cable
company invite an independent competitor to broadcast over its
Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting; Television Satellite Stations Review of
Policy and Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3539 (1995) ("Cable operators, for example, operate
at a local level, and are increasingly becoming composed of regional clusters. In addition
many cable systems are owned or managed by cable multiple system operators ('MSOs'),
which might operate these local franchises at a national level.") (footnotes omitted).
76. Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS"). See Eric T. Werner, Something's Gotta Give:
Antitrust Consequences of Telephone Companies' Entry into Cable Television, 43 FED.
COM. L.J. 215, 227 (1991) ("DBS . . . employ[s] high-powered satellites to transmit
programming directly to viewers equipped with small receiving antennas.").
77. H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 16(a)(2) (1992) ("[C]able television
service is available to more than 90 percent of American households, more than 62
percent of American households subscribe to such services, and the majority of viewers
rely on cable as the conduit through which they receive terrestrial broadcast signals.").
78. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2466 (1994).
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coaxial cable? I believe that the government submitted evidence
to this effect in the Turner Broadcasting case on remand, again
concerning the "must-carry" issues.79
When Mr. Joffe speaks about diversity and competition, I think
it is appropriate that we make the point that one does not necessari-
ly follow the other. While there might be diversity in program-
ming, there might not be competition in programming. That was
really what the Supreme Court had in mind when it referred to
diversity in the telecommunications area. 80
I can fairly conclude here because what I am trying to do is
challenge Bob Joffe-to see how he might respond. But it is worth
noting how the rules have in fact changed in this area.
Back in the 1960s and the 1970s, the FCC and the government
were given great leeway to insist upon diversity and antagonistic
viewpoints because the telecommunication industry meant only
radio and broadcast television. The Supreme Court said in Red
Lion8" that no one has a First Amendment right to be a broadcast
television station.82 The electromagnetic spectrum is limited.
Therefore, the government must necessarily be a referee as to who
can be given a license to provide broadcast television. 83 As a re-
sult, government has, and must have, the authority under the First
Amendment to impose certain public interest conditions upon
broadcast licensees.84
Since Red Lion, technology has changed. Whereas none of us
have a First Amendment right to become a broadcast television
provider, cable companies do have a First Amendment right to
provide cable programming or content. Although we in the gov-
79. Brief for Appellee at * 17, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, No. 95-992;
1996 WL 23280 (U.S. Jan. 22,1996) (motion to affirm) ("cable operators have the incen-
tive and the ability to use their dominant position in ways that could be harmful to com-
petitors").
80. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466 n.8.
81. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
82. Id. at 388-96.
83. Id.
84. id.
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ernment argued that Red Lion should apply to the cable industry, 5
we did not succeed on that argument in Turner. The Supreme
Court has become insistent on a higher standard of First Amend-
ment scrutiny when an issue concerns cable content or cable pro-
gramming. 6 Nonetheless, these diversity standards must be ap-
plied. We shall see what the Supreme Court will say in the Turner
remand opinions8 7 as to what discretion Congress must have in
applying these principles. Having said that, I will conclude and
wait for Bob Joffe to reply.
MR. GOODALE: Mr. Joffe, you can defend yourself in any
way you want, but in so doing, I would appreciate your considering
this question, which I think is important not only for the media but
also for race relations and for a philosophical view of what the
government's role is in our life.
Is it your view, Mr. Joffe, that the government has no role
whatsoever in promoting diversity of speech in our lives?
MR. JOFFE: I don't have any problem with government pro-
moting diversity, as long as it does so in a way that does not inhib-
it the speech of others. In other words, if the government wanted
to give monetary grants to organizations that do not have the abili-
ty to buy time on television, or otherwise speak, that does not both-
er me at all. What I have a problem with is when government
helps some by causing others not to speak. For instance, where
government takes channels away from a cable operator and requires
the cable operator to turn them over to others. It seems to me that
is something the First Amendment does prohibit. John Tyler and
I have just argued that case in the D.C. Circuit and are waiting for
the outcome on the constitutionality of access laws.8 That is a
very different situation.
The First Amendment does not say anything about promoting
diversity. It does not even say anything about the rights of listen-
ers. It says "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
85. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456.
86. id. at 2449.
87. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1996).
88. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 910 F. Supp 734 (D.D.C. 1995).
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dom of speech."' 9 Pure and simple, that is what it says. It re-
strains government action.
If the government has a role to play in promoting diversity, it
comes from other government powers, not from the First Amend-
ment. The First Amendment does not have a provision like the
14th Amendment which says the government has the power to
make laws to further it.9° The First Amendment is a constraint on
the government. The government's right to promote diversity co-
mes from its rights to promote the public good found elsewhere in
the Constitution.
MR. CONDON: Can I interrupt you? I have one question.
Isn't your concept-of not objecting to government assisting par-
ties, who, for example, might not otherwise be in a position eco-
nomically to make their voice heard-in some respects worse and
more intrusive? Because what you really are doing, if you want to
take the antitrust case, is looking at particular mergers and saying
there is too much concentration of ideas here, we want to keep
those levels lower in terms of concentration so that there will be
other voices heard.
You are saying that the government is affirmatively stepping in
and saying: "We are going to promote a single voice, which we
think is not being heard." Doesn't that introduce government inter-
vention into the marketplace of ideas affirmatively?
MR. JOFFE: I agree there could be a problem. The promotion
of ideas through funding would have to be done in a very careful
way. For instance, I do not think you could pass a bill that said,
"Congress shall help unpopular ideas" anymore than you could pass
a bill that says, "Congress shall fund popular ones." Grants essen-
tially would have to be available to all on some kind of equal ac-
cess basis. If CBS wanted to apply for a grant, so be it.
You cannot start creating means tests or other kinds of discrim-
inatory ways of handing out these grants because I think that would
raise very, very serious problems.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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On the other hand, I do not see why Congress could not do
something else. For instance, the funding of the PBS station is
perfectly constitutional. As far as I know, it has not been success-
fully challenged.
Let me make two other quick points. First, on this cable point,
I think there are ways programming can get to the home other than
through cable. But let me stress this point: a cable operator, even
without competition from another cable operator, has a lot of incen-
tives to give customers what they want. Only 50 percent to 60
percent of most areas subscribe to cable.91 There is a great incen-
tive on the cable operator to make his programming package as
attractive as possible to the potential audience so it can get as
many people as possible to subscribe for as much as he can charge.
If it is only going to provide 12 channels, it is not going to be able
to get as many people to subscribe if it were to provide 77. If it
makes the price too high, fewer people will subscribe. Thus, there
is a powerful incentive to provide programming that is attractive.
That incentive increases now that you can buy a little 18 inch dish
for $599 and get a package of 77 services for $34 a month. 92 You
can put that dish in your apartment window in most parts of New
York City. Outside of New York City, you can put it on your
rooftop.
In Omaha, Nebraska, you can get television programming from
U.S. West, the local telephone company, in a video dial tone exper-
iment that is soon going to be spreading throughout the country.
So cable operators have a tremendous incentive to provide good
programming.
As far as the advertising point goes, cable operators get 25
times more revenue from subscriber revenues than they do from
91. Cf. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (explaining "Inlearly fifty-six million households, more than sixty percent of
all households with televisions, subscribe to cable service"); see also, H.R. REP. No. 628,
supra note 78.
92. See Geraldine Fabrikant, A satellite is successfully launched, and the shares in
a direct to home television company lift off, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at D6 (explaining
Echostar offers satellite dishes for approximately $599; the price for 75 channels ranges
from $19.95 to $39.95 per month depending on service provided).
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advertising.93 Therefore, cable operators do have an incentive to
provide different kinds of services.
Time Warner Cable of New York, for instance, provides several
different news services. They provide CNBC and Turner Financial
News Network. One source they have a partial ownership interest
in through Turner, NBC, the other, they clearly do not have any
interest in.
Let me say one final word about the media mergers. None of
the three media mergers that have recently been in the news-the
CBS,94 the ABC, 95 or the Time Warner-Turner merger-involve
any really significant horizontal overlap. These mergers do not
provide any significant traditional antitrust problems. If they are
going to be attacked under the antitrust laws, that can only be ac-
complished by changing those laws or by grafting other concepts
into the antitrust laws.
Take the Time Warner-Turner situation, the one which with I
am most familiar. At the moment, prior to the merger, Turner is
approximately 20 percent owned by Time Warner and approximate-
ly 20 percent owned by TCI. Both have negative control provi-
sions in the corporate papers governing the control of Turner. TCI
is giving up that negative control over Turner in return for a very
small, very diffuse interest in Time Warner. Under either proposal
currently before the FCC, TCI would either have no voting power,
would have the votes on their shares cast by the chairman of Time
Warner, or would receive non-voting stock.
What one must compare is not the Time Warner-Turner merger
93. Cf. Tuned out and dropping off (Interactive TV), ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 1995 (U.S.
ed.) (explaining "the cable industry... raises less than 20% of its revenue from advertis-
ing").
94. See Stockholders of CBS, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 95-469
(released Nov. 22, 1995) (FCC decision approving merger between CBS and Westing-
house); see also Paul Farhi, FCC To Approve Takeover of CBS; Agency Resolves Fight
Over Children's Shows, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995 at El.
95. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 96-48
(released Feb. 8, 1996) (FCC decision approving merger); see also Paul Farhi, Walt
Disney To Buy Capital Cities/ABC; $19 Billion Merger Would Create A Giant In Movies,
Television, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1995 at Al.
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compared to some mythical situation of sellers of red wheat #2, but
the Time Warner-Turner merger before and after. The "before" is
a situation where Time Warner's operations are effectively block-
aded by the negative control of TCI. TCI is giving that up for the
"after," which would be an eight percent ownership interest in
Time Warner, without any power to affect how those shares are
voted. Under traditional antitrust analysis, this certainly would be
no problem.
MR. GOODALE: Let me pick up on the question of horizontal
overlap and ask you a hypothetical question. Perhaps the panel will
chime in on it also, so we can focus on whether the landscape of
jurisprudence has changed at all in light of the new communication
and media alliances.
Under the 1996 Act, as I understand it, a broadcaster's owner-
ship of stations can go from the present level of 25 percent of the
national audience to 35 percent of the audience.96 Let's suppose
that the rule was not 25 percent or 35 percent but 100 percent.
This would mean that a broadcaster, let us say, Fox could own a
television station in every market in the United States, or certainly
it could own one in every major market.
Would that violate the antitrust laws? I ask you as an antitrust
expert, because it raises the issue of horizontal overlap because
each city is separate. Is there anything in the panel's view of pub-
lic policy that would militate against the adoption of such a rule?
Mr. Joffe, do you want to take that on?
MR. JOFFE: This is the example that Mr. Condon read from
Pitofsky's article where one family owned the only newspaper in
20 towns. Here we are talking about a television station owned by
Fox in every town.
Now how do you analyze that? You look in two markets. You
look in the market in which the television station sells, and you
look in the market in which it buys.
In the market in which they sell advertising time, television
stations face a tremendous amount of competition from other tele-
96. 1996 Act, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat 56, 111.
[Vol. 6:427
1996] SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON NEW MEDIA ALLIANCES 459
vision stations, radio stations, and newspapers. It is inconceivable
that there would be an antitrust problem in the market in which
they sell, except perhaps some local market-let's say some town
in northern Louisiana-where Fox was the only television station.
Even there, it would probably face competition from radio and
newspaper. But putting that aside, generally there would be no
problem in the market in which they sell.
Let's look at the market in which they buy-the programming
market. The people who sell programming, the Warner Brothers
and the other similar studios, sell into a market where there are
many, many buyers on a national level. I am sure Fox, even if it
owned a station in every town in the United States, would still be
accounting for, at most, five percent of the programming material
bought in the United States. I would see no antitrust problem
there. I think it would be a significant problem to create some
scheme under which that kind of acquisition would be unlawful.
MR. GOODALE: That means it is not unlawful. The market-
place controls, the Chicago School triumphs, and the rest of us on
the panel are sitting and wondering whether this is sound public
policy, or even if it is sound legal policy. What are the rest of the
views?
MR. TYLER: I can address horizontal concentration. In the
cable market, as of March 1994, it was known that the top ten
cable MSOs controlled approximately 63 percent of the market.97
That is, they owned approximately 63 percent of the cable systems
in the United States.
When we take that into account, we also have to take the ef-
fects of vertical integration into account. I think there is good
argument for government intervention to ensure that other indepen-
dents have access to the telecommunications market.
We have to remember that a cable company has an inherent
interest in cable casting its own programming, that is the program-
97. See generally Joseph S. Kraemer, Local competition: Changing Ground Rules for
Network Access, Bus. COMMUNICATIONS REV., Sept. 1994 (explaining that the top 10 cable
MSOs controlled more than 56 percent of the market).
460 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
ming it has an interest in. Taking that as true, as I think we must,
when a big MSO buys a little "Mom and Pop" cable system who
has, until then, carried its own independent mix of programming,
this MSO will have the incentive to drop that independent mix of
programming and, instead, put on its vertically integrated program-
ming. That is how it can make more money in the advertising
market. That is a factor that arose in the "must-carry" lawsuit.98
So when Mr. Joffe speaks of competition, he's pointing at DBS
and he is pointing at newspapers and movies, but it must always be
borne in mind that when you are talking about video programming,
these large MSOs do control the programming conduit. They are
gate keepers. They have incentives to discriminate against a com-
petitor.
MR. JOFFE: I was not talking about a merger of all the cable
companies in the United States. As I understood your hypothetical,
Mr. Goodale, you were talking about one television station in every
city owned by the same entity, with other television stations com-
peting.
MR. GOODALE: His argument was responsive although the
medium was slightly different. I understand your point.
MR. TYLER: I intended it to be as such. It has been predicted
that in the near future only about five MSOs will own all cable
systems in the United States.
MR. JOFFE: But if each cable operator is a local monopolist,
and I am not conceding this for a second, even if you combined all
the cable operators in the United States, in the market in which
they sell (i.e., to the consumer), there is no change. Right now
someone in the city of Buffalo, New York is facing a monopolist
if a cable operator is a monopolist, and the person in the city of
Dubuque, Iowa, is facing a monopolist. After this merger of all
cable companies they would still be facing that same monopolist.
There would be no difference.
In the market in which the cable operators buy programming,
there might be an argument. The sellers of programming to cable
98. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2453-54.
[Vol. 6:427
1996] SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON NEW MEDIA ALLIANCES 461
operators, who before may have faced ten purchasers and now face
100 purchasers, would only face one purchaser. If the market in,
which cable operators buy is a separate market from the market in
which television stations buy, then there would be an antitrust
problem. The HBOs and the Showtimes of the world, instead of
facing ten purchasers, would face one purchaser. That might raise
an antitrust issue.
MR. JOLLYMORE: The question that Chairman Pitofsky's
article raises is the important question. In your hypothetical Mr.
Goodale, where Congress or the FCC allowed one entity to own as
many licensees as would serve 100 percent of the market, should
you look at the market which a broadcast licensee serves-the
viewers? Should you consider the issue of whether ownership of
such a large string of stations would affect the content of the infor-
mation that is received by the market served?
Sumner Redstone hints that you should consider the viewers in
an antitrust analysis,99 but I think that would go far beyond what
Pitofsky would advocate. If you look at the general position the
FCC and our government takes, it does not appear that the govern-
ment is prepared to take that step. The direction has been to re-
duce content regulations like the "fairness doctrine," ° to reduce
the regulations that were aimed at increasing the multiplicity of
voices by governmental action,'0 and to rely on the growth of
different media outlets such as the Internet, cable television, and
direct broadcast satellite transmissions to provide the kind of diver-
sity of opinion and information that it is perceived society needs. 102
99. See Redstone, supra note 4.
100. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding
that the FCC could decline to enforce the Fairness Doctrine if the FCC found the doctrine
inhibited speech); see also FCC Fairness Report of 1985, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985) (FCC
announces policy of discontinuing the enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine); Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming FCC's decision to
discontinue enforcing the fairness doctrine).
101. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 657.
102. 133 CONG. REC. S8453-04 (1987) ("[Wie must not ignore the obvious intent of
the First Amendment, which is to promote vigorous public debate and a diversity of
viewpoints in the public forum as a whole, not in any particular medium ....") (state-
ment of President Ronald Reagan vetoing S.742, an attempt by Congress to enact the
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MR. GOODALE: Mr. Condon, I do not know what your view
would be. I suppose Sumner Redstone's view would be that evi-
dence of diversity of opinion and the impact of this merger on" such
diversity would be admissible.
MR. CONDON: I think that is right. I think what Sumner
Redstone is suggesting is not that First Amendment values become
a separate antitrust analysis, but that in applying the antitrust laws
and making judgments on the margins as to which cases to pursue
and which cases not to pursue, it is appropriate that one of the
factors to keep in mind is this concept of diversification.
Clearly the direction which has been taken legislatively is to
allow an increase in concentration of ownership in various distinct
types of delivery systems. 10 3
Thus, in some respects, Redstone's comments are contrary to
the political direction in which we seem to be heading. But on the
flip side you have to make judgments as to when you decide that
newspapers are no longer an appropriate market or television sta-
tions are no longer an appropriate market. I would suggest that we
are not so far along the information superhighway at this point that
those distinctions are not still appropriate. From a market defini-
tion point of view, I would take issue with the breadth of the mar-
ket Mr. Joffe would define. I would suggest that the concept of
applying First Amendment values may be even more appropriate,
given the flexibility that companies are now being granted to get
into the cross ownership of various types of media outlets.
MR. GOODALE: Aren't you two like the captain of the Titan-
ic who's rearranging chairs on the bow?
MR. CONDON: I would argue something different. I think
Fairness Doctrine).
103. 142 CONG. REC. H1078-03, H1121 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (Conference Report
on S. 652, Telecommunications Act of 1996) ("Section 207b of the Senate bill requires
the [FCC] to changes [sic] its rules regarding the amount of national audience a single
broadcast license may reach. The current cap is 25% of the nation's households. The
Senate bill raises that to 35%."); see also 142 CONG. REC. S687-01, S698 (daily ed. Feb.
1, 1996) (unanimous consent agreement) ("The conference report... expands the national
limit on TV ownership to 35 percent national market reach.") (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
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what Sumner Redstone is suggesting, and Redstone probably would
not argue with the general direction of recent legislation because
he has obviously participated in a number of significant merger and
acquisitions transactions which have extended Viacom into other
methods of distribution, is that we should make sure that in this
changing technological world we are not providing significant eco-
nomic entities the ability to concentrate to such an extent and
across such a broad band of information supply so that in ten or
fifteen years, there could be three or four players in the media
world, and a lessening in diversity of ideas.
MR. GOODALE: Mr. Tyler, aren't you just rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic? You start off with this great "must-
carry" legislation when cable was a dominant medium. Now we
have got the Internet which is going to take over everything. It
looks like a little different piece of litigation now, doesn't it?
MR. TYLER: I would not predict litigation. It is interesting,
of course, that the 1996 Act changes everything enormously but
that Congress decided not to take up what some had advocated as
far as required access under these various media. 1°4 For example,
should the telephone companies, if they are allowed into the video
market, be required to provide or act as a common carrier, at least
to the extent of certain channels? That is, if they are going to
provide their own video programming, should they be required to
carry the video programming of independent programmers? Con-
gress has allowed telephone companies to make their own mind up
in that regard, and so choices have'been made. We will see. May-
be we won't have to wait until ten years from now.
104. See House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and National Communications
Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of 1993, 1994 WL 213812 (F.D.C.H. Feb.
2, 1994):
The Alliance for Community Media endorses Section 659 of H.R. 3636, which
would require common carriers to provide PEG access capacity on the same
basis to the current requirements of cable companies. However, the Alliance
recommends that Section 659 be amended to require common carriers to pro-
vide equivalent "services, facilities and equipment" for access use, on the same
basis that the 1984 Cable Act requires of cable franchisees.
Id. at *4 (testimony of Anthony Riddle, Chair of the Alliance for Community Media).
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MR. GOODALE: Rearranging the deck chairs, Mr. Joffe?
MR. JOFFE: They have been rearranged.
MR. GOODALE: I want to thank you all for listening to this
panel, and I want to thank the panelists.
